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'I would like to thank Pieter Ruys for useful remarks on a previous draft of the paper.Abstract
In this paper we present a model of a firm in which the skewness of the wage
distribution in the firm depends on the substitutability of the labor inputs. We
consider a wage schedule that is based on gaTrees with a perrníssio-n structure. We
show that for supermodular production technologies this wage schedule satisfies
the property that the ratio between the wages of employees in two consecutive
levels of a firm lies between one and the span of control. Using constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) production technologies we show that this ratio increases
with the substitutability of the labor inputs. It reaches the upper bound (the
span of control) for linear production technologies. It reaches the lower bound
(one) for Cobb-Douglas production technologies.
1 Introduction
In this paper we present a model of a firm in which the skewness of the internal wage
distribution depends on the substitutability of the labor inputs. We consider a hierar-
chically structured firm in which a production process takes place according to some
supermodular production function. Similarly as in, e.g., Simon (1957), Williamson
(1967), Keren and Levhari (1979, 1983), and Radner (1992), the production process
is carried out by the workers who constitute the lowest level of the hierarchical firm
structure. The participants in higher levels are managers or coordinators who organize
and coordinate the production process.
The coordination task of coordinators can have various forms. For example,
it can be that the managers in the upper levels of the hierarchical structure make
decisions based on information that is available to the workers in the lowest level. The
intermediate coordinators process this information from the workers to the upper level
managers. In the other direction, the intermediate coordinators process the decisions
made by the upper level managers to the workers. If the decision process in the firm
is decentralized then also decentralized decisions have to be made by the coordinators.
For a survey about these coordination tasks we refer to Radner (1992).
In this paper we consider a hierarchically structured firm to be described by a
set of participants (workers and coordinators), a hierarchical coordination structure,
and a production technology. We are interested in determining a wage schedule which
1determines what will be the wage of the workers and the coordinators on the different
levels of the coordination structure. We assume this wage schedule to be determined by
the permission value being a solution concept for games with a permission structure as
introduced in Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink (1992). The use of this permission value
is motivated by the characterizations that are given in van den Brink and Gilles (1996)
and van den Brink (1996). We restate these characterizations for the firm model that
is described in this paper. It turns out that according to this permission value the wage
of a coordinator always is at least as high as the wage of every employee that is directly
subordinate to him, while his wage never exceeds the sum of the wages of his direct
subordinates. We also show that these bounds are sharp in the sense that there are
production technologies for which these bounds are reached. In the special case that
the workers are identical in the production process and the firm has constant span of
control, i.e., every coordinator has the same number of direct subordinates, this means
that the ratio between the wage of a coordinator and each of his direct subordinates
lies between 1 and the span of control. This lower bound is often assumed in the
literature (see, e.g., Simon (1957), Williamson (1967), Calvo and Wellisz (1978, 1979)
and Radner (1992), and is supported by, e.g., Carlson (1982). Williamson (1967) argues
that also the upper bound is realistic. The model that is discussed in this paper gives
a reasoning for these bounds.
After discussing the general model we use constant elasticity of substitwtion
(CES) production technologies to illustrate this result. Moreover, we give a reasoning
when the ratio between the wages of coordinators and their direct subordinates is close
to 1 and when it is close to the span of control s. We show that this ratio is increasing
in the elasticity of substitution of the labor inputs. It reaches the lower bound 1 for
Cobb-Douglas technologies, and the upper bound s for linear technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and state the
main results. In Section 3 we illustrate this model using CES production technologies
and show how the skewness of the wage distribution in the firm depends on the substi-
tutability of the labor inputs. Section 4 gives some concluding remarks. Finally, there
are two appendices. One which describes games with a permission structure, and the
2other which gives the proofs of the propositions in Section 2.
2 Hierarchically structured firms and the permis-
sion value
In this paper we model a firm as a triple (N, f, S), where the finite set N denotes the set
of participants in the firm, f is a production function, and S: N --~ 2`~ is a coordination
structure. The participants in S(i) are called the successors of participant i E !V.
They are the participants that are directly subordinate to participant i. On the other
hand, the participants in the set S-'(i) :- {j E N ~ i E S(j)}, refered to as the
predecessors of i, are the ones to which i is directly subordinated. By S we denote
the transitive closure of the coordination structure S, i.e., j E S(i) if and only if there
exists a sequence of participants (hl, ..., ht) such that hl - i, hkfl E S(hk) for all
1 G k G t- 1 and ht - j. Thus, S(i) are all direct and indirect subordinates of
participant i. We assume the permission structure to have a tree structure, i.e., it
satisfies the following two conditions
~ there is exactly one participant io E N such that S-1(io) - 0 and S(io) - N`{io};
~ for every i E N` {io} it holds that' ~S-1(i)~ - 1 and S-'(i) ~ {i}.
Similarly as in, e.g., Simon (1957), Williamson (1967), Keren and Levhari (1979, 1983),
and Radner (1992), we assume that the only `productive' participants are the ones in
the lowest level of the hierarchy, i.e., the participants that have no successors. We
refer to these participants as the workers in S and denote this set of participants by
WS -{i E N ~ S(i) - 0}. The other participants are the rrzanagers or coordinators
who do not actively produce but who coordinate the production process. We denote the
set of coordinators in S by MS - N`WS. For an arbitrary set of participants E C N
we denote by S(E) the set of workers who are (directly or indirectly) subordinate to
coordinators in E, i.e., S(E) :- S(E) fl WS.
lln the sequel we denote by ~E~ the cardinality of E C N
3Since the production proces is carried out by the workers in WS we describe this
production proces by a production function f: ~Wsl ---~ IR where IR~WsI is the non-
negative orthant of the ~WS~-dimensional euclidean space. We assume the production
technology to exhibit complementarities with respect to the labor inputs and f(x) - 0
if x; - 0 for all i E WS. This implies the production function to be supermodular2.
Example 2.1 Consider the set of participants N-{ 1, ..., 8} and coordination struc-
ture
S(1) - S(2) - S(3) - S(4) - 0, S(5) - {1,2}, S(6) - {3,4}, S(7) - {6}, S(8) - {5,7}.
This coordination structure is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The coordination structure S of Example 2.1
The set of workers is WS -{1, 2, 3, 4}, the set of coordinators is the set MS -
{5, 6, 7, 8}. The set of all subordinates (directly and indirectly) of participant 7 is
the set S({7}) - {3, 4, 6}. The workers in the set E - {2, 3, 6, 8} are the ones in the
set S(F,) -{2,3}. An example of a production function for this firm is the function
f(x) -(~4-1 ~;)2 for all x E]R~. In this production function x; is the labor effort that
is provided by worker i E Ws.
ZA production function f: ~ W's~ -~ 1R is supermodufar iff(x)f f(y) C f(max(x, y))-f-f(min(x, y))
for all x, y E~W `~, where max(x, y) E i~lW'`~ is the vector whose i`h component is the maximum of
x; and y;, and min(x, y) E~ Wsl is the vector whose i`h component is the minimum of x; and y;.
4A triple (N, f, S) as described above is called a hierarchically structured firm. ~Ve
assume the wages of the participants in a hierarchically structured firm (!~', f, S) to be
determined by the permission value cp(f, S) E IRN which is studied in van den Brink
and Gilles ( 1996) and van den Brink (1996), and is briefly discussed in Appendix r1 of
this paper. From this appendix it follows that the permission value cp(f, S) is given by
~f(E) , for all i E N, (1) 4~;(f,S)- ~ ~EUS-'(E)~ ECWS
({;}uS(;))nE~O
where S-'(E) :- {j E N ~ S(j)flE ~ 0} for all E C N, and the dividends are given by
01(E) '- ~FCE(-1)IEI-IFI f(xF) with xF E 1R.~WS~ being the vector in which all workers
in F supply their full effort, and all other workers supply zero3. These dividends can
be seen as the productivity of the subsets E C Ws. The dividend ~~(E) represents
the production that is generated by E and was not already generated by the subsets
of E. For a discussion of these dividends we refer to Harsanyi (1959). The permission
value distributes the dividend of a set of workers E equally among the workers in E
and their superior coordinators.
Example 2.2 Consider the firm (N, f, S) that is given in Example 2.1. Suppose that
x; - 1 if worker i E{1,2,3,4} is active, and x; - 0 otherwise. Thus, f(xE) - ~E~2 for
E C WS. The dividends 0~(E) for E C WS -{ 1, 2, 3, 4} are given by
if~E~-1
if ~E~ - 2
otherwise.
The permission value of participant 1 is given by cpl(f, S) - {i (s,a}j ~ ~{i(z,s a}j }
o~({is}) } o~({i,a}) - i~?}?.} ?- 90 In a similar way we can determine ~{i,s,s,s,~,s}~ ~{i,a,s,s,7,a}~ - s a s s so'
the permission values of the other participants. This yields
cp(f, S) - 60 (90, 90, 79, 79, 150,134, 134, 204).
3Note that supermodularity of f here means that f(xE) ~ f(xF~ ~ f(xEUF~ ~ f(xEnF~ for all
E,FCWs. -
5Note that ~8-i yr;(f, S) - 16 which is exactly equal to the value f( xWs) that can be
produced when all workers are active.
A motivation for using this permission value in determining wages is given by the
following characterization. It can be verified that the permission value satisfies the
following properties. Firstly, it is efficient, i.e., for every hierarchically structured firm
(N, f, S) it holds that ~;E,v y~;(f, S) - f( xWs). Secondly, it is additive, i.e., for two
production functions f, g and coordination structure S it holds that y~(f-~ g, S) -
4~(f~ S) ~ 4~(9, S), where (f -~ 9): 1R~W5~ -~ 1R is given by (f -~ 9)(x) - f(x) -~ 9(x). A
participant i E N is inessential in a hierarchically structured firm (N, f, S) if every
worker that he coordinates does not add anything in the production process, i.e., for
every j E({i } U S(i)) f1 WS and every pair x, y E IRWS with xh - yh for all h E Ws `{ j}
it holds that f(x) - f(y). The permission value satisfies the inessential participant
property meaning that for every inessential participant i it holds that cp;(f, S) - 0.
In the literature about the firm it is often argued that the wage of a manager in
a firm is always at least as high as the wages of any of its subordinates (see, e.g.,
Simon (1957), Williamson ( 1967), Calvo and Wellisz ( 1978, 1979), and Carlson (1982)).
The permission value satisfies this property, i.e., cp;(f, S) 1 y~~(f, S) for all i E Ms
and j E S(i). This property is refered to as structural monotonicity. Finally, a
worker i E WS is called necessary in the production process if without his labor effort
nothing can be produced, i.e., f (x) - 0 if x; - 0. The permission value satisfies the
necessory worker property meaning that for every necessary worker i E WS it holds
that yo;(f, S) ~ cp~(f, S) for all j E N. It turns out that the permission value is the
unique wage schedule that satisfies these five properties. Therefore, if we want a wage
schedule to satisfy these properties it has to be determined by the permission value.
(The proof of this result is implicitly given in the proof of the characterization of the
disjunctive permission value in van den Brink (1996), and is therefore omitted.)
Next, we compare the permission value of a coordinator in a hierarchicaly structured
firm with the permission value of his successors. It turns out that the permission value
of a coordinator in a hierarchically structured firm is at least as high as the permission
6value of any of its successors, and it is at most equal to the sum of the permission
values of its successors.
Proposition 2.3 For every hierarchically structured firm (N, f, S) it holds that
Es( j`Pi(f, S) ~ 4~;(.Í~, S) ~~ 4~.i(f, S) for all í E Ms,
jES(i)
where Ms denotes the set of coordinators in S.
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix B. The next proposition shows
that these bounds are sharp in the sense that there are hierarchically structured firms
such that the inequalities are equalities. The proof of this proposition also can be found
in Appendix B.
Proposition 2.4 For every hierarchically structured farm (N, f, S) and coordinator
i E Ms it holds that
(~) if there exists a j E S(i) such that for every h E S(i) ` S(j) and every
E C W with Efl S(j) - 0 it holds that f(~E) - f(~E`{h}) then y~;(f,S) -
maxiES(;) 4~i(f, S);
(ii) if for every h E S(i) and every E~ h it holds that f(xE) - f(~E`{h}) ~ f(~{h})
then 4~;(f, S) -~jES(;) 4~i (.f, S).
The first part of this proposition states that the payoff of a coordinator i is equal to the
payoffof his highest payed successor j if every worker Iz that is coordinated by i and
not by j E S(i) does not increase the productivity of any set of workers E that does not
contain workers coordinated by j. In other words, the payoff of coordinator i is equal
to the payoff of his highest payed successor j if the workers that are coordinated by i
but not by j need workers that are coordinated by j in order to be productive. The
second part of the proposition states that coordinator i's payoff is equal to the sum of
the payoffs of all his successors if every worker h that is coordinated by i increases the
productivity of every set of workers by the value f(x{h}) which he also can produce
on his own without cooperating with other workers. In other words, coordinator i's
7payoff is equal to the sum of the payoffs of all his successors if all workers that are
coordinated by i only produce on their own in the sense that there are no synergies
when they cooperate with other workers.
In the mentioned literature about the firm it is assumed that the workers in WS
are identical in the production process. With (1) it can be shown that in that case
the permission values of participants who take similar positions in the coordination
structure are the same. From Proposition 2.4 we can straightforwardly derive that in
this case the ratio between the wage of a coordinator i and the wage of each of his
successors lies between 1 and the number of successors of i. If we also assume that
the hierarchical coordination (tree) structure has constant span of control, i.e., every
coordinator has the same number of successors s, as is done in, e.g., Simon (1957) and
Williamson (1967), then we have the following.
Corollary 2.5 For every hierarchically structured firrrt (N, f, S) with constant span of
control s and identical workers it holds that
1 G ~~(f' S) G s for all i E MS and j E S(i).
- ~~(f, S) -
In the literature it is often assumed that the ratio between the wage of a manager and
the wage of his successors lies between 1 and the span of control s. Corollary 2.5 shows
that the permission value satisfies this assumption. In the next section we show how
for constant elasticity of substitution (CE5) production functions this ratio depends
on the substitutability of the labor inputs.
3 Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) produc-
tion technologies
In this section we illustrate the model that is discussed in the previous section using
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions. As in the previous
section, we assume that the production process that takes place within the firm is
carried out by the workers in the lowest level of the hierarchy. The other participants
are coordinators who coordinate the production process.
83.1 A 2-level firm
In this subsection we consider a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
process which produces an output using two types of labor inputs that can be provided
by the workers 1 and 2 according to the production function fP: ]Rz -~ 1R given by
.ÍP(x) -?' (a(~1)P -~ (1 -~)(xz)P)P for all x-(xi, ~z)T E 1Rz, 0 C p C 1.
In this production function x; E IFZ is the amount of labor that is provided by worker
i E W-{1,2}. In order to establish symmetry of the workers we take a- 2.
We assume that every worker i E W can choose either to provide all his labor
effort in producing the output (in which case x; - 1) or to provide nothing at all (in
which case x; - 0). Thus, if the workers in E C W are active in the production process
~ 1 ifiEE
then the labor inputs are given by the vector xE E 1Rz given by ~F -
0 else.
The production technology thus is given by
~
.iP(~F) - 7 ~i~ ~ if ~E~ - 1
y if~E~-2.
The dividends for this production technology are given by
7(2~ P if IEI - 1
01p(E) - y(1 -(2~' 1) if ~E~ - 2
Next, suppose that these production processes take place within a firm with 3 employees
and coordination structure S on N- {1, 2, 3} given by S(1) - S(2) -~, S(3) -{ 1, 2}.
This coordination is illustrated in Figure 2. It has two hierarchical levels and span of
control s - 2.
With (1) it then follows that the permission values for the coordinator 3 and the workers
1 and 2 are given by
4~3(fP, S) - - 1 ~ ,
3 ( `2 I P )
iFigure 2: Coordination structure S of the firm in Section 3.1
and
1 ótl
cp;(fp,S) - 3 1-~2~ for i E {1,2}.
The ratio between the wages of coordinator 3 and the workers 1 and 2, denoted by
b(p), then is given by
~
b(P) :-
`Ps(Ïa,S) - 1 -~ (1~2)P
4~i(fv,S) - 1 -(1~2)óti
for p E (0,1].
lf,
Since
d~P --zt,~'~z 1~}i ) 0 for p E (0, 1], this ratio is increasing in p, i.e.,
(a(1-(l~z)' ))Z
the difference between the wages of the coordinator and the workers increases if the
substitutability of the labor inputs increases. (Note that b(p) does not depend on the
parameter y.)
Below we consider the two extreme cases p- 1 and p -~ 0, and an intermediate case
p-1~2.
(i) If p- 1 we have a linear production technology (as in Williamson (1967)) with
production function
fl(xE) - 2~~E ~~2)- 2(~E~) for all E C W-{1,2}.





0 if ~E~ - 2
The permission values of the employees then are given by y~3(fl, S) - 2 and
y~,( fi, S) - 4 for i E {1, 2}, and thus ó(1) - 2. Thus, in case of perfect sub-
stitutability of the labor inputs the ratio between the wage of the coordinator
and the wage of the workers is equal to the span of control s- 2.
(ii) If p~ 0 then the production function approaches a Cobb-Douglas production
function given by
E E E `Y tfE-W
fo(~ ) - 7~1 ~z -
0 else.
This production function expresses complementarity of the labor inputs. In
this case the dividends are given by
0 if ~E~ - 1
O~o(E) -
7 if IEI - 2,
and the permission values are given by cp;( fo, S) - 3 for i E{ 1, 2, 3}, and thus
S(0) - 1. Thus, in this case the wages of the coordinator and the workers are
equal, i.e., the ratio between the wage of a coordinator and the wage of the
workers is equal to 1.
(iii) Finally, we consider an intermediate case with p- 2 in which case the produc-
tion function is given by
z
fi~z(~E) -?' `2 `~E ~ xz I~ - 4(~E~)z for all E C W.
11In this case the dividends are given by
~ if~E~-1
Ot~iz(E) - 7 if ~E~ - 2, z
and the permission values are given by y~3(fl~z, S) - 2 , and cp;(f1~2, S) - 24
for i E {1,2}. Thus, 1 C b(1~2) - 7 C 2.
Thus, the ratio between the wage of the coordinator and the wages of the workers
in a 2-level firm with CES production technologies and span of control s equal to 2
lies between 1 and the span of control 2. This ratio depends on the character of the
production process that is carried out within the firm. The lower bound 1 is reached for
linear production technologies. The upper bound s - 2 is reached for Cobb-Douglas
production technologies.
For a 2-level firm with span of control s) 2 we can derive similar results. In this
case also the wage differential is increasing in p with ó(1) - s for the linear production
technology, and ó(0) - 1 for the Cobb-Douglas technology.
3.2 A 3-level firm
In this example we consider a CES production process which produces an output using
four types of identical labor inputs that can be provided by the workers 1, 2, 3, and 4
according to the production function fP: IR4 ~]R given by
~
4 1 Pl v
fp(~)-ry~~~4x;~ I forallxElR4, OGpCl.
`,-i ` j
Similarly as in the previous subsection we assume the workers either to provide full
labor effort or to provide nothing. The labor input vector ~E, E C WS is defined
similarly as in the previous subsection. These production processes take place within
a firm with 7 employees and hierarchical coordination structure S on N-{ 1, ..., 7}
given by
S(1) - S(2) - S(3) - S(4) - 0, S(5) - {1,2}, S(6) - {3,4}, S(7) - {5,6}.
12Figure 3: Coordination structure S of the firm in Section 3.2
This coordination structure is illustrated in Figure 3. It has three hierarchical levels
and span of control s- 2.
Again, we consider the following three special cases with respect to p.
(i) In case p- 1 we have a linear production technology with production function
fl(xE) - 4~xE - 4(~E~) for all E C W- {1,2,3,4}.
;-~
In this case the dividend ~~,(xE) is equal to 9 if ~E~ - 1, and equal to 0
otherwise. The permission values are given by y~( f1i S) - 12 (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 4),
and thus, the ratio between the wage of a coordinator and the wage of his
successors is equal to the span of control s- 2.
(ii) If p--~ 0 then the production function approaches a Cobb-Douglas production
function given by




In this case the dividend Ofo(xE) is equal to ry if ~E~ - 4, and equal to 0
otherwise. The permission values are given by cp;(fo, S) - 7 for all i E N.
Thus, the wages are the same in all levels of the hierarchical structure, i.e., the
ratio between the wage of a coordinator and the wage of his successors is equal
to one.
13(iii) Finally, we consider an intermediate case with p- 2 in which case the produc-
tion function is given by
a 2
f~~z(xE) - 16 ~(~
xE~ - 6(~E~)z for all E C W.
~-i
In this case the dividends are given by
ry if~E~-1 is
O~ti~(E) - 8 if ~EI - 2,
0 otherwise,








if i E {1,2,3,4}
if i E {5, 6}
ifi-7.
Thus, in this intermediate case it holds that (i) the ratio between the wages of
a coordinator and of his successors is larger for the coordinators in the lower
level of the hierarchy, and (ii) at every level this ratio is strictly between 1 and
the span of control s- 2.
Again, similar results can be derived for firms with span of control s) 2.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have illustrated how games with a permission structure and the
permission value can give a reasoning for the assumption that the ratio between the
wages of employees in two consecutive levels of a firm lies between 1 and the span of
control s. Using CES production technologies we have shown that this ratio depends
on the character of the production process that is carried out within the firm. The
upper bound s turned out to be reasonable for linear production technologies. The
lower bound 1 is reasonable for Cobb-Douglas technologies.
14The model that is developed in this paper can be applied in various ways. In
van den Brink and Ruys (1996), for example, it is used in endogenously determining
the optimal size of the firm. In that paper it is assumed that the span of control of a
firm is constant and exogenously given but the number of hierarchical levels variabel.
The owner of the firm is represented by the topman io and his profit is given by t.he
permission value of this topman. He then chooses the number of levels (and thus firm
size) that maximizes his profit, i.e., that maximizes his permission value. This gives
an alternative model to the models of Williamson (1967) and Qian (1994).
Appendix A: Games with a permission structure
In this appendix we briefly discuss ga~rees with a per~rcission structvre which are in-
troduced in Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink (1992) and the permission value which
is extensively studied in van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1996).
A game with a permission structure is a triple (N, v, S), where N is a finite set of
players, v: 2N -r IR is a characteristic function such that v(~) - 0, and S: N--r 2N
is a per~nission strvcture. By S we denote the transitive closure of the permission
structure S, i.e., j E S(i) if and only if there exists a sequence of players (hl, ..., h~)
such that hl - i, hkfl E S(hk) for all 1 C k G t- 1 and ht - j. Further we de-
note S-1(i) :- {j E N I i E S(j)}. Now we assume that a player i E N needs
permission from all players in S-1(i) before he is allowed to cooperate. Thus, the co-
operation possibilities are limited as expressed by the modified characteristic function
Rs(v):2N --~ 1R given by
~s(v)(E) - v(~(E))~
where v(E) - {i E E ~ S-I(i) C E} for all E C N. Now, the per~rcission value cp is
the allocation rule that assigns to every player i in a game with a permission structure
(N,v,S) its Shapley value (Shapley ( 1953)) in 1Zs(v), i.e.,
~;(v,S) - Sh;(~s(v)),
15where
w(E) for all i E N, Sh,(v) - E~ ~E,~ ,
E3i
with dividends (see Harsanyi (1959)) are given by ~„(E) :- ~F~E(-1)IEI-IFIv(F) for
a11ECN.
In Section 2 we represented a firm by a triple (N, f, S) with N the set of partic-
ipants (consisting of a set of workers WS, and a set of coordinators MS), a production
function f: ]R~WS~ -~ 1R, and a permission structure S: N-~ 2n`. The corresponding
game with permission structure (N, v, S) is constructed as follows. First we define the
characteristic function v on the set of workers WS by v(E) - f(xE) for all E C Ws,
where xE is the vector of labor inputs that can be provided by the workers in E. We
extend this characteristic function to the class N of all participants using the charac-
teristic function v given by v(E) - v(E fl WS) for all E C N. Note that the dividends
discussed in Section 2 are equal to the dividends discussed here, i.e., Of(E) - 0„(E)
for all E C N. Then the permission value of hierarchically structured firm (N, f, S) is
given by cp( f, S) - cp(v, S), i.e.,
~ti(f, s) - ~~(v, S) - ~ o~s~v~(E)
ECN IEI
E~t
- ~ w(E) - ~ ~f(E)~.,, for all i E N.
ECWS IE U S-1(E)I ECWS
({i}uS(i1~nE~m ({i}uS(il)nE~O
~G V J-'~GII
(The third equality follows from a result that is stated in Gilles, Owen, and van den
Brink (1992).) This is the value that is given in equation (1) and is used in determining
wage schedules in hierarchically structured firms.
16Appendix B: Proofs
We conclude this paper by giving the proofs of the propositions stated in Section 2.
We do this using an alternative expression of the Shapley value, namely
Shi(v) - ~(INI - IEI)~((IE~ - 1)~ v E v E z for all i E N. - (INU! ( ( ) - ( ~ { })) (z)
ECN
E3i
Let (N, v, S) be the game with permission structure cooresponding to the hierarchi-
cally structured firm (N, f, S) as described in Appendix A. lising expression (2) in
determining the permission value for (N, f, S) yields"
4~i(f, S) - 4~i(v, S) - ~ P(E)(~s(v)(E) - ~s(v)(E ` {
E3i
~ p(E)(v(a(E)) - v(a(E ~ {i}))
E3i




~ ~ P(E) (f(~F) - f(xF~s(i))1 for all i E N,
E3i FCa(E)nS(E) 1
S(i)nF~O
where p(E) :- (~N-IEU!((IEI-I)! and S(E) :- S(E) rl WS for all E C N. (~kN).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3
Let (N, f, S) be a hierarchically structured firm, and let (N, v, S) be the corresponding
game with permission structure as described in Appendix A.
4In the remainder of the proof we denote ~E~i for ~E[N.
E3i
17Since f is supermodular and f(x) - 0 if x; - 0 for all í E N it holds that v is monotone
and convex5, and thus 1ZS(v) is monotone and convex (see Gilles, Owen, and van den
Brink (1992)), i.e.,
Rs(v)(E) c RS(v)(F) for all E C F C N,
and
1Zs(v)(E U F) f RS(v)(E f1 F) ~ 1Zs(v)(E) f RS(v)(F) for all E, F C N.
For notational convenience we denote w- RS(v) - v(v(E)) for all E C N in the
remainder of the proof. As noted in the text, the first inequality of Proposition 2.3
follows from structural monotonicity of the permission value. This can also be shown
with expression (2) using the facts that for every i E MS and j E S(i) monotonicity of
w implies that
(i) w(E) - w(E ~{j}) - 0 for all E~l i, E~ j (since Q(E) - v(E ~{j}) for all
E C N with E~ i);
(ii) w(E) - w(E ~{i}) 1 0 for all E~ í, E~í j (since a(E ~{i}) C~(E) for all
E C N);
(iii) w(E) - w(E ~{j}) G w(E) - w(E ~{i}) for all E~ i, j (since
a(E `{i}) C a(E `{j}) for all E C N).
With this it follows that
cp;(f, S) - cp;(v, S) - Sh;(w) -~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E `{i}))
Es:
- I ~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E `{
`E3~,~




5A characteristic function v on N is monotone iC v(E) G v(F) for all E C F C N. A characteristic
function v on N is convex if v(E U F) f v(E fl F) 1 v(E) } v(F) for all E, F C N. Note the similarity
between convexity of v and supermodularity of f(see footnote 3).
18) ~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E ~ {j}))
E3i,j
-~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E ~{j})) - Shj(w) - ~pj(v, S) - y~j( f, S).
E3j
In order to prove the second inequality we first note that for every i E MS with
S(i) -{ jl, ..., js} convexity of w implies that for every k E { 1, ..., s} and E C N it
holds that
w(E) 1 w(E `{jk}) f w I E` U jl l- w I E` U jl l.
` 1-k}1 f ` (-k J
But then
s-i
(s - 1)w(E) - ~ w(E)
k-1
~~ I w(E `{~k}) f w I E` U jl I- w~E ` U ~l)~ ` ` 1-k-}1 1 !-k
~ (w(E `{jk})) ~ w(E ` {j,}) - w ~E ` U jl~
k-1 ` l-1
~ w(E `{jk}) - w I E` U jt~
k-1 ` l-1
~ w(E ~ {j}) - w(E ~ S(i)).
JES(i)
Since all players in MS are null playerss in v, for every i E MS it holds that w(E` {i}) -
w(E`S(i)), and thus (s-1)w(E) ?~jES(i)w(E`{j})-w(E`{i}), which isequivalent
to
w(E) - w(E `{i}) C sw(E) - ~ w(E ` {j}) - ~ (w(E) - w(E ` {j})).
jES(i) jES(i)
sPlayer i E N is a null p(ayer in v if v(E) - v(E ` {i}) fot all E C N.
19With (2) it then follows that y~;(f, S) - y~i(v, S) - Sh;(w) G~jES(i) Sá
~)ES(i) ~j(v~ `~) - LjES(i) ~j(f~ S)'
Thus the second inequality in Proposition 2.3 is satisfied.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.4
Let (N, f, S) be a hierarchically structured firm and let i E MS. Further, let (N, v, S)
be the corresponding game with permission structure as described in Appendix A, and
let w - RS(v).
(i)
Let j E S(i) be such that for every h E S(i) `S(j) and every E C N with Ef1 S(j) - 1~
it holds that f(xE) - f(xE`{h}) Then
(i) w(E)-w(E~{i})-OifE~i,E~j;
(ii) w(E) - w(E ~{j}) - 0 if E ~ i, E~ j;
(iii) w(E) - w(E `(S(i))) for all E C N with E f1 S(j) - ÍD.
From this and the facts that w(E `{i}) - w(E `S(i)), w(E `{j}) - w(E `S(j)) for
all E C N, and S(j) C S(i) it follows that
4~i(f, S) - y~;(v, S) - Sh;(w) - ~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E ` {i}))
E~i
- ~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E ~ {í}))
E3i,i
- ~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E `S(i)))
E3i,j
2~~ p(E)(w(E) - w((E ~ S(j)) ~ S(i))
E~i,j
~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E ~ S(j)))
E3i,j
~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E ` {j}))
F,~i,j
~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E ~{(j})) - Shj(w) - y~j(v, S) -~j(f, S).
E3i
Suppose that for every h E S(i) and every E~ h it holds that f(~E) - f(~E`{h}) ~
f(~{h}) Then
(i) w(E) - w(E `{2}) -~hEo(E)ns(i) v(h) for all E~ i;
(ii) w(E) - w(E `{J }) -~hEo(E)nS(j) v(h) for all j E S(i) and E~
(iii) S(i) fl S(j) - S(j) for all j E S(i);
(iv) w(E) - w(E ~{j}) - 0 if E~ i, E~ j.
With this it follows that








~ ~ p(E) ~ v({h})
- ~ ~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E ~ {j}))
jES(i) E3i,j
~ ~ p(E)(w(E) - w(E` {j}))
jES(i) E3j
~ ~j(w) - ~ 4~j(v~ S) - ~ 4~i(f, S)-
jES(i) jES(i) jES(i)
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